The author analyses the concept of free will in the context of the psychophysical problem. He builds his analysis upon the presumption that the contemporary debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists is not of high relevance, since “free will” is a highly technical and vague term. So instead of directly answering questions like “Is free will possible?” or “What is free will?”, he starts his analyses from specifying a solution to the psychophysical problem and then works towards a possible definition of free will.
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Title
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About the author
About the book
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Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1: Mainstream contemporary solutions to the so-called “free will problem”
Introduction
The problem of free will
Possible relations between free will and determinism
Incompatibilism
Meaning of “could have done otherwise”
Argument for incompatibilism: The consequence argument
Free will and the consequence argument
Compatibilism
Arguments for compatibilism
Discussion of arguments for compatibilism
Summary
Chapter 2: Free will and dualism
Introduction
Cartesian dualism
Arguments for Cartesian dualism
Freedom of will
Problems of interactionism in Cartesian dualism
Problems of Cartesian dualism with respect to free will problem
Other dualist solutions
Summary
Chapter 3: Free will and materialism
Introduction
Biological naturalism
Anomalous monism
Eliminative materialism
Summary
Chapter 4: Free will and transcendental idealism
Introduction
Theoretical problems with eliminative materialism
Transcendental idealism and free will
Things in themselves, appearances and eliminative materialism
Kant and free will in relation to compatibilism and incompatibilism
Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien, 2023. 150 pp.
Krzysztof Krenc is a philosopher, psychologist and computer scientist who specialises in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of artificial intelligence.